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Consciousness is a great mystery to science. Despite several attempts, none of 
the current theories have managed to explain how and why it exists. Theories 
struggle with fundamental philosophical questions, such as the hard problem, that 
contests how something mental, like consciousness, can be explained by 
physical phenomena such as neural activity. Modern neuroscientific study of 
consciousness puts aside this and a few other yet unreachable questions. It 
focuses on finding the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) comprising the 
physical phenomena, which correlate with certain aspects of consciousness. In 
the NCC studies, consciousness is usually taken to have two aspects: the states 
of consciousness, encompassing awake, dreaming, and unconscious states, and 
contents of consciousness, such as an experienced perceptual stimulus.  
Experimental anesthesia and functional brain imaging are essential tools for the 
search of the NCC. Anesthesia offers a reliable and reversible method to alter the 
subject's state of consciousness. The brain function during these altered states 
of consciousness can be measured with functional imaging methods, such as 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). It measures neuronal activity via 
a blood oxygen level dependent (BOLD) signal. Functional connectivity analysis 
of the BOLD-signal can be used to explore the organization of spatially distinct 
brain areas into functional networks, which are associated with specific cognitive 
functions such as attention control and emotional regulation. Recently, several 
studies have shown that changes in functional connectivity between and within 
these networks are also associated with altered states of consciousness induced 
by anesthetic drugs. This review will cover the essential questions and 
methodology of current exploration of neural correlates of states of 
consciousness, focusing on the resting state networks and the use of fMRI and 
experimental anesthesia as research tools. Effects of different anesthetics on 
these networks are also compared. 
Different anesthetics used in experimental anesthesia have quite distinct 
pharmacological mechanisms of action, even though the induced brain functional 
connectivity patterns resemble each other. Propofol-induced unconsciousness is 
mediated either from corticocortical or thalamocortical disconnection. The 
nonspecific thalamic nodes, related to arousal and distribution of information, may 
have an important role in propofol-induced unconsciousness. Dexmedetomidine 
has similar patterns in connectivity changes as propofol, but the connectivity 
between deeper brain regions and thalamus remains less affected, possibly 
explaining the easier arousal from dexmedetomidine-induced unconsciousness. 
Ketamine increases the overall functional connectivity but disrupts the 
connectivity in the higher-order networks of the brain inducing “dissociative 
anesthesia”. The role of thalamic functional connectivity during ketamine 
anesthesia has not been studied and would be an interesting subject for future 
studies.  
Asiasanat: tietoisuus, anestesia, lepotilaverkostot 
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1 INTRODUCTION  
 
Consciousness as a state we experience constantly when awake and while dreaming, 
is still a great mystery to science. There is no acknowledged explanation for how and 
why it exists even though numerous theories of consciousness have been proposed. 
Most of them struggle with a few fundamental questions. The hard problem is probably 
the most famous, contesting how something mental, like our thoughts or 
consciousness, can be derived from a physical object such as the brain.  
 
Neuroscientific study of consciousness has put these complicated questions aside for 
now to focus on a scientifically more straightforward task of finding the neural 
correlates of consciousness (NCC). They are the minimal neuronal mechanisms that 
jointly enable conscious experience (Koch et al., 2016). NCC, as well as the whole 
concept of consciousness is divided into contents and states of consciousness. 
Contents of consciousness are the different components that we experience in our 
consciousness, such as experienced visual or auditory stimuli. Visual processing has 
especially been studied to understand the neural correlates of the contents of 
consciousness. The state of consciousness refers to being awake, dreaming, or being 
unconscious and it has been studied by measuring the effects of experimental 
anesthesia and natural sleep for example. 
 
For measuring brain activity during altered states of consciousness, three imaging 
modalities are commonly used in the search of NCC: functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRI), electroencephalogram (EEG), and positron emission tomography 
(PET) imaging. These modalities offer a non-invasive way to trace alterations in brain 
activity. Areas of the brain that have temporally correlated activity are considered to be 
functionally connected. With further analysis, functionally connected networks can be 
revealed. These networks are called resting state networks as they can be studied also 
when the subject is at rest without any specific task. They have different functions, for 
example in cognitive processing and in regulating attention. Recent studies also link 
functional connectivity between and within the networks to altered states of 
consciousness induced by anesthetic drugs. Resting state networks come across as 
promising targets for finding the NCC, and the answer to understanding how brain 
function relates to consciousness might be in understanding the function and relation 
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of these networks. This review will cover the essential questions and methodology of 
current exploration of the neural correlates of the state of consciousness focusing on 
the resting state networks and the use of fMRI and anesthesia as research tools. 
2 FROM CONSCIOUSNESS TO ITS NEURAL 
CORRELATES 
 
Consciousness is the function of the mind which allows us to experience the world from 
a subjective point of view. Such experiences include the redness of an apple and 
understanding the phrases we hear. It also allows us to wonder about the concept of 
consciousness and speculate the nature of the whole concept of consciousness. 
Countless philosophers and scientists have formed and tested numerous theories of 
consciousness, but none of them has been acknowledged as an all-encompassing 
theory that explains its fundamental nature. The main problem with explaining 
consciousness is how to link and explain the interaction of mental experiences and 
their physical substance. Hard problem, coined by Chalmers (1996), questions how 
anything physical, such as neuronal activity in the brain, can give rise to a totally distinct 
phenomenon of subjective experience like the redness of an apple. Explanatory gap, 
coined by Levine (1983), associates the hard problem. It underlines the gap between 
neuronal activity and subjective experiences by asking if we can ever determine what 
happens in between. Some have declared these questions unsolvable. (Revonsuo, 
2010; Långsjö, Revonsuo and Scheinin, 2014) 
2.1 Philosophical theories 
Monistic philosophical theories argue that the universe is made of one substance: 
physical (materialism), mental (idealism), or neither of these (neutral monism). 
Theories concerning consciousness are eliminative materialism that tries to eliminate 
the whole uniqueness and mental side of conscious experiences to some unsurprising 
mechanical brain functions. Reductive materialism accepts consciousness as a mental 
phenomenon but argues that it can still be reduced to a physical process in the brain. 
Microphysicalism claims that everything in the world can be reduced into so small basic 





Emergent materialism is the opposite of reductive materialism. The main statement 
can be compared to organisms that create a whole that is more than the sum of the 
different cells themselves. Also, consciousness could somehow emerge from the 
brain's single neurons working together. Emergent materialism has two components: 
weak emergence that hopes we can one day figure the brain function so precisely that 
the mystery of emerging consciousness vanishes. Strong emergence argues that the 
relationship between neurons and consciousness is inexplicable. Emergent 
materialism is in principle a viable theory but may not be more than wishful thinking for 
future neuroscience. (Revonsuo, 2010; Långsjö, Revonsuo and Scheinin, 2014) 
 
Functionalism is a neutral monistic theory that treats consciousness as complex causal 
relations between given entities or simplified as the software of the brain. This way 
there is no need to determine physical or mental origin for consciousness. It is just a 
state of function in an information-processing system. Global workspace theory is an 
example of functionalist theory where subjective information processed in the brain 
creates the stream of consciousness. (Revonsuo, 2010; Långsjö, Revonsuo and 
Scheinin, 2014) 
 
Panpsychism is another neutral monistic theory consisting of a view that every single 
atom in the world contains something mental. This way consciousness is created from 
the amount of material and everything from a rock to a single cell would have some 
level of consciousness. (Revonsuo, 2010) 
 
Currently one of the most promising theories of consciousness associates 
functionalism and panpsychism in integrated information theory (IIT) created by Giulio 
Tononi et al. (2016). It claims that consciousness consists of the complexity of 
integrated information and in the human brain, with extremely high levels of complexity, 
consciousness also becomes highly developed. This theory, however, has its 
weaknesses: how can unconsciousness exist when there is always some information 
and complexity in the brain. The explanatory gap between mind and matter remains 
and the theory also allows sophisticated machines to gain consciousness to some 
extent. (Revonsuo, 2010; Långsjö, Revonsuo and Scheinin, 2014) 
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2.2 Neural correlates of consciousness 
With the difficulties of answering the hard problem and the explanatory gap, scientists 
turned the study to focus on more empirical and experimental ways. After the first case 
reports in the 1960s about surgical and brain-damaged patients with some 
associations to consciousness, the relationship between mind and brain started to gain 
interest. In the 1990s neuroscientists started first proper empirical and experimental 
studies to find the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC), referring to minimal 
neural mechanisms that are jointly sufficient for a specific conscious experience. 
(Långsjö, Revonsuo and Scheinin, 2014; Koch et al., 2016; Seth, 2018) 
 
At first, the study focused mainly on the contents of consciousness and visual 
consciousness was the most studied subject; what happens and in what order in the 
visual cortex, when for example a flash of light or an image is brought into our 
consciousness. The focus was mainly on the cortex of the brain. (Långsjö, Revonsuo 
and Scheinin, 2014). A separate strand started focusing the study on the state of 
consciousness by examining the transition of different states utilizing sleep, brain-
damaged patients, and anesthesia. The goal was to find the core neural network that 
enables the state of consciousness per se. (Långsjö, Revonsuo and Scheinin, 2014; 
Seth, 2018) 
2.3 Definition of consciousness 
Concept of consciousness includes more than the state of being awake as it generally 
may be understood. According to Hudetz (2008), consciousness is a subjective 
experience of internal or external stimuli and one’s own existence in time and space. 
Among researchers, the current concept of consciousness is even wider, a vague 
superordinate heading covering contents of consciousness and different and altered 
states and types of consciousness (Långsjö, Revonsuo and Scheinin, 2014).  
 
A generally used division of the whole concept of consciousness is the distinction 
between states of consciousness and contents of consciousness. The state of 
consciousness refers to the background state of the brain that allows us to have any 
subjective experiences i.e.contents of consciousness. Different states of 
consciousness are for example being awake, dreaming or unconsciousness. The 
contents of consciousness refer to the specific qualitative and subjective experiences 
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perceived in the conscious state, such as a seen image and a heard tune. (Långsjö et 
al., 2012; Långsjö, Revonsuo and Scheinin, 2014)  
 
The state and contents can also be divided further. Nowadays commonly used division 
of the state of consciousness includes connected and disconnected consciousness 
and unconsciousness (Figure 1). Connected consciousness allows conscious 
perception of external stimuli (visual, auditory, etc.) and internal awareness (inner 
speech, mind-wandering, and autobiographical memories). Explicit and implicit 
memories are possible. When anesthesia deepens and the subject falls asleep, there 
may follow a state of disconnected consciousness, e.g. dreaming. This includes 
conscious experiences without perception of the environment. In a disconnected 
conscious state, the subject has internal awareness, but no awareness of the external 
world. Conscious sensory processing can happen (seeing colors and smelling 
something for example), but it is not related to the external world. Memories are also 
possible in this state. The most commonly expected anesthetic state is 
unconsciousness, defined as inability to achieve any subjective experiences. All 
responses in this state are non-voluntary and imply no conscious connection to the 
environment. Sensory processing is possible, but it is not accessible by 
consciousness. (Bonhomme et al., 2019) 
 








Yes No No 
Behavioral 
responsiveness 
Yes No No 
Subjective 
experiences 
Yes Yes No 
Figure 1. | Different states of consciousness (Scheinin et al., 2021). 
 
A clinically straightforward way used to divide consciousness is awareness and 
arousal. Awareness refers to all the contents of consciousness creating a conscious 
experience. It can be divided into self- and external awareness, and it is dependent on 
a sufficient level of arousal, i.e. level of consciousness. Clinically awareness is 
measured as the ability to communicate, follow orders, or localize pain to show that 
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the subject is connected to the environment. Arousal, on the other hand, refers to the 
base level of consciousness that exists, if the subject for example opens eyes for a 
loud noise or painful stimulus. (Boly et al., 2008; Hudetz, 2008; Heine, Soddu, Gomez, 
et al., 2012; Långsjö, Revonsuo and Scheinin, 2014). Awareness and arousal are 
usually positively correlated, such as falling asleep, when arousal starts to decrease 
so does awareness. However, REM sleep is an exception when there is high 
awareness but low arousal. (Boly et al., 2008; Heine, Soddu, Gomez, et al., 2012) 
 
3 USING ANESTHESIA AS A TOOL TO STUDY 
THE NEURAL CORRELATES OF 
CONSCIOUSNESS 
 
Modern general anesthesia is based on the synergy of different pharmacological 
substances. The idea of this balanced general anesthesia was introduced by John 
Lundy in 1929 and it consisted of narcosis, amnesia, analgesia, and immobility that 
can be achieved without deep levels of the central nervous system (CNS) depression. 
(Bailey, 2001). Anesthetic drugs induce unconsciousness and amnesia. Some of them 
are mildly analgetic but in balanced general anesthesia, opioids are commonly used to 
prevent painful stimuli. Immobility is created with a muscle relaxant to ensure desirable 
working conditions for the surgeon. (Olkkola et al., 2020) 
The narcotic features of anesthetic drugs can also be used in experimental anesthesia 
to alter the state of consciousness reversibly and reliably. They offer an ideal way to 
study the neural correlates of the states of consciousness and they are a necessary 
addition to the methods of natural sleep and disorders of consciousness. With the use 
of experimental anesthesia, the brain’s neural activations and deactivations can be 
studied reliably and repeatedly during the loss (LOC) and the return of consciousness 
(ROC). (Långsjö, Revonsuo and Scheinin, 2014; Bonhomme et al., 2019) 
 
3.1 Unconsciousness during anesthesia 
Concerning the concept of studying consciousness as a state, especially with 
anesthetic drugs, there is a fundamental challenge of how to precisely define the 
subject's state of consciousness. Consciousness itself can not directly be measured 
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and thus the subject's state of consciousness has commonly been tested by measuring 
the loss of responsiveness: the consciousness is regarded as lost when the motor 
responses to commands end. However, this requires motivation and co-operation. 
Memory trace is another way to verify that the patient was properly sedated during 
anesthesia. However, this method also has its limitations as the anesthetics cause 
amnesia even with sedative doses and intraoperative awareness might happen even 
though there is no explicit memory from it. (Hudetz, 2008; Långsjö, Revonsuo and 
Scheinin, 2014) 
 
When responsiveness is used as a measurement for consciousness, a sedated subject 
might not be motivated enough to answer the question even though the level of 
consciousness is sufficient. Also, the voluntary motor process responsible for 
answering might be more affected by the anesthetic than the sensory-perceptual 
process responsible for awareness leading to clinically noted unconsciousness. This 
is because the exact mechanism of anesthetic actions on different neuronal areas is 
not known. Also, patients with akinetic mutism or locked-in syndrome can be fully 
conscious without the ability to express it. (Hudetz, 2008) 
 
Means to measure consciousness without the need for co-operation have been 
developed. EEG applications, such as BIS, PSA, Narcotrend, and Entropy are widely 
used in normal surgical anesthesia. These methods have been proven with large 
patient populations but still, fail to provide an explicit and instant assessment of 
consciousness. They mostly rely on the dominance of high versus low-frequency 
content in EEG. (Hudetz, 2008). Also, fMRI has been used to determine 
consciousness: In a case report by Owen et al. (2006) a subject in clinically vegetative 
state activated the same brain regions as the reference group when they heard stories. 
Also, corresponding willful activations were observed when asked to for example 
imagine playing tennis, suggesting that the patient was conscious. Qiu et al. (2017) 
studied the patterns of resting state networks to predict patients' arousal from 
comatose state and found common factors for predicting consciousness to return.  
 
The last interesting factor to consider is the relation of consciousness to memory. 
According to Hudetz (2008), there might be a chance that unconsciousness under 
moderate levels of anesthesia might be only because of amnesia from anesthetics. 
Consciousness itself might be present, but all the conscious experiences are just 
 
8 
forgotten as they emerge as if they were never even recorded. Sanders et al. (2012) 
researched the subject with isolated forearm technique (IFT), where a cuff is used to 
prevent muscle relaxant from paralyzing the patient’s arm and provide a way for 
communication during anesthesia. They executed a Medline search, leading to the 
discovery that in up to 37% of the cases there was a positive response in IFT during 
anesthesia. The incidence of anesthesia awareness with explicit recall of the surgery 
is only 0,2% (Sandin et al., 2000), suggesting that connected consciousness during 
anesthesia, measured with IFT, is more common than expected. 
3.2 Different anesthetic drugs 
Anesthetic drugs have developed far from the first public demonstration of ether-
anesthesia in 1846 and nowadays there are many options to choose the best suitable 
for the subject. All anesthetics have their characteristic effects on how they affect 
consciousness and brain function. Their mechanisms of action, however, are not quite 
completely understood. The general theory of an anesthetic to induce LOC is that the 
molecules bind with certain proteins, receptors, and ion channels in neuronal 
synapses. The effects they have on these targets vary significantly but the neuronal 
activation/deactivation patterns are quite similar. (Franks, 2008)  
 
All anesthetics affect generally the whole brain's neurons. There is no consensus of a 
common pharmacological mechanism or a specific location for anesthetic drugs to 
induce unconsciousness. However, some important areas that anesthetics have an 
effect on are the thalamus and functional networks of the forebrain in the parietal-
cingulate-precuneus region. On the network level the effect that anesthetics have on 
functional connectivity differs depending on the agent, dose and network studied. The 
anesthesia-induced LOC is generally considered to be a disruption of higher-order 
cortical information integration. (Franks, 2008; Hudetz, 2012). In this article three 
intravenous anesthetics, propofol, dexmedetomidine, and ketamine are reviewed in 
detail. 
 
3.2.1 GABAa receptor: 
The most common anesthetic method to induce loss of consciousness is by 
potentiating the activity of inhibitory gamma-amino-butyric acid (GABA) in pentametric 
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GABAa receptors, found throughout the CNS. It is considered to be the main 
mechanism of action with propofol, thiopental, etomidate, and volatile anesthetic 
agents (e.g. sevoflurane, isoflurane, and desflurane). They potent the GABA-induced 
Cl- currents and with higher concentrations may also activate the receptors directly. Of 
all anesthetics, only ketamine, xenon, and cyclopropane have little or no direct effect 




Propofol is a commonly used intravenous anesthetic. Its pharmacological mechanism 
of action is considered mainly to be mediated through GABAa-receptor complex 
activation that prolongs inhibitory postsynaptic currents and increases inhibitory 
synaptic transmission. (Franks, 2008) 
 
It is non-soluble to water and must therefore be used as an emulsion. It is widely 
distributed and has fast clearance, so a continuous infusion or repeated boluses are 
needed to keep the subject sedated. The induction dose of healthy adults is 2-2,5mg/kg 
causing LOC in about 30 seconds. The recovery of consciousness happens also fast 
in 5-10 minutes when the concentration in blood is around 1-2µg/ml. In clinical practice, 
anesthesia may be maintained with a target-controlled infusion (TCI) pump. It 
calculates the desired cerebral concentration, which can be individually titrated with 
computer models. (Olkkola et al., 2020) 
 
Propofol causes apnea by reducing the hypoxic and hypercarbic breathing reflexes. It 
also reduces blood pressure and cerebral perfusion depending on the dose by 
vasodilatation and direct cardiac effect. Pressure is also decreased in the eye and the 
skull which is useful in certain situations. Propofol’s analgesic EC50 is weak, with 
concentration up to 16µg/ml. It causes amnesia with sub-anesthetic doses and less 
postoperative nausea than other anesthetics. Propofol is metabolized mainly in the 
liver to inactive glucuronides and sulphate conjugates that are excreted into urine.  




3.2.2 NMDA receptor: 
Another target to pharmacologically induce unconsciousness is to inhibit the action of 
glutamate. Glutamate is an excitatory neurotransmitter, that has many receptors in the 
CNS but for anesthetic effect, the N-methyl-D-aspartate (NMDA) receptors are 
considered most important. These receptors also mediate spinal cord synaptic 





Ketamine is an NMDA receptor antagonist, and its main pharmacological mechanism 
is blocking the excitatory NMDA-receptors non-competitively. It might also have effects 
on opioid or opioid-like receptors especially with higher concentrations, but it does not 
seem to have a direct effect on the GABAa receptor-complex. (Franks, 2008) 
 
Ketamine is an interesting anesthetic drug as the effects it has on the brain are almost 
inverse compared with other anesthetics. Ketamine raises the brain’s metabolism and 
perfusion, especially with sedative subanesthetic levels. It is the only anesthetic that 
does not cause global depression in the cerebral blood flow (CBF), and it is also 
hemodynamically neutral, analgesic, and generally does not cause apnea. (Olkkola et 
al., 2020) 
 
Ketamine induces loss of responsiveness with a bolus of 0,5-1,0mg/kg in 30-60 
seconds. For maintenance, the dose is about half of the induction dose every 10-15min 
or a continuous infusion of 0,5-3,0 mg/kg/h. The return of connected consciousness 
happens in 5-15min and is due to redistribution. It is a racemic compound, and its S-
enantiomer binds NMDA-receptor 4-5 times more eagerly than R-enantiomer and 
delivers the anesthetic and analgesic effects. (Olkkola et al., 2020) 
 
To cause unconsciousness, ketamine is suggested to create a sensory block to the 
brain's association tracts so that the subject goes into dissociative anesthesia and 
sometimes to a cataleptic state when the eyes are open and breathing and reflexes 
remain normal. Similar behavioral abnormalities have been reported with other NMDA 
receptor antagonists. (Långsjö et al., 2005; Franks, 2008; Olkkola et al., 2020) 
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3.2.3 Alpha-2 adrenoceptor: 
 
Alpha-2-agonists are sedative compounds that can also be used as anesthetics. They 
are sympatholytic, anxiolytic, and analgesic. They are also used to prevent the rise of 
blood pressure during intubation for example. Their effects can be blocked by alpha-




Dexmedetomidine is a specific and selective alpha-2 adrenoceptor agonist. It can be 
used in short sedation, but it is not recommended to use in the induction or 
maintenance of anesthesia. For sedation, the dose is 1µ/kg in 10-20min and after that 
continued according to the response (0,2-0,7µg/kg/h). The distributive half-life is 
around 6 minutes, and the half-life of the elimination phase is two hours. 
Dexmedetomidine is metabolized in the liver. (Olkkola et al., 2020) 
 
Dexmedetomidine induces anesthesia similarly to normal sleep by mainly activating 
the alpha-a2-receptors in locus coeruleus (LC) that inhibit the sympathetic nervous 
system’s noradrenaline release in ventrolateral preoptic nucleus (VLPO). This 
activates inhibitory GABA and galantamine mediated tracks leading to the loss of 
consciousness. Also, hypothalamic sleep pathways are suggested as the mechanism 
of action. Dexmedetomidine has a unique feature that the subject can be woken up 
from pharmacologically deep sedation with a loud noise for example. (Franks, 2008; 
Olkkola et al., 2020) 
 
4 FUNCTIONAL MAGNETIC RESONANCE 
IMAGING AND BRAIN RESTING STATE 
NETWORKS 
 
To find the NCC, a method to measure brain activity is essential. None of the current 
modalities can measure neuronal activity directly, but it can be seen via a secondary 
phenomenon, such as electric current, metabolic activity, or changes in blood flow. 
Electroencephalogram (EEG) uses electrodes on the skull to measure electrical 
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changes caused by neuronal firing. Positron emission tomography (PET) is an imaging 
method that utilizes radioactive tracers such as fluorodeoxyglucose (FDG) that 
accumulates to the areas in the brain where metabolism is high. Functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) is an application for magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) that 
measures neuronal activation via altering blood flow and oxygen-levels of hemoglobin.  
4.1 Basics of MRI and fMRI 
Magnetic resonance imaging is generally the best modality for anatomic brain imaging. 
It has excellent tissue contrast which allows it to precisely define brain structures and 
anatomical connections (Valanne and Soinila, 2015). Its spatial resolution is in the 
millimeter level (Boly et al., 2008). With some modifications, it can also measure the 
functional signal, with temporal resolution of around a second, or with echo-planar up 
to 20-100ms (Poustchi-Amin et al., 2001). 
 
The image acquisition is based on the features of an atom nucleus in a magnetic field 
when excited with a resonating radiofrequency pulse, hence the original name of 
nuclear resonance imaging. The most commonly used atom is hydrogen (H) and the 
image contrast on some occasions is created from the different concentrations of 
hydrogen atoms in the tissue. (Lipton, 2014) 
 
4.2 BOLD-contrast 
In fMRI, the functional component comes from blood oxygen level dependent (BOLD) 
signal. Hemoglobin molecule has different magnetic properties when it has oxygen in 
it (diamagnetic oxyhemoglobin) versus when it has released the oxygen to tissue 
(paramagnetic deoxyhemoglobin). A clear dip in the BOLD signal can therefore be 
seen when the oxygen is consumed. After the initial dip, there is a compensatory peak 
in the signal when fresh blood and oxyhemoglobin are carried in place after 4-6 
seconds. With this known behavior of the signal, it is possible to determine where the 
neurons consume oxygen and are active. (Lindquist and Wager, no date; Buxton et al., 
2004; Liu, 2013) Similar regional brain activation to similar tasks are seen both in 
BOLD-signal and EEG, confirming the neural origin of the BOLD-signal (Tagliazucchi 




4.3 Weaknesses of fMRI 
Like all current functional brain imaging modalities, also fMRI has its weaknesses. Two 
main problems are the signal-to-noise ratio and relatively slow speed of image 
acquisition, both resulting from the core mechanism of MRI. The signal-to-noise ratio 
of fMRI is relative to the temporal resolution and normally when acquiring anatomical 
images many repetitions of the same slice are made to better average the significant 
signal from noise, making the scans last even hours. Tracing a fluctuating brain 
activation with BOLD signal, however, needs fast enough image acquisition, around 
twice as fast as the fluctuations, for a satisfactory estimate. This means that the fast 
imaging techniques cannot use repetitions of a slice and the signal-to-noise ratio of the 
BOLD signal remains weak. Repetitions can be however made with the study design 
such as the subject repeats the task multiple times during imaging protocol to get a 
good average and contrast. Also, group analysis is a viable option to enhance the 
result. In group analysis, standardized subjects are scanned in a similar setting, and 
with normalization enhanced BOLD data can be received. (Lindquist and Wager, no 
date). Noble et al. (2017) showed that group analysis made with data from multiple 
sites and with different scanners is reliable enough for the current studies. 
 
The slow speed in image acquisition creates noise to the signal from subjects' 
involuntary movements. To counter this, all imaging acquisitions need to be 
preprocessed. Motion correction is used to get rid of the small involuntary movements 
as well as cardiac pulsation and respiratory cycles. Different tissue types like white 
matter and cerebrospinal fluid (CSF) might create noise and need to be preprocessed. 
Also, variances in hypercapnia or oxemia create noise to the signal and can be 
compensated with artery spin labeling (ASL) for example. (Lindquist and Wager, no 
date; Liu, 2013; Jann et al., 2016). The scanner itself creates a considerable amount 
of noise in the result, but by trying to remove it totally, also some significant signal 
might be lost. (Lindquist and Wager, no date; Långsjö et al., 2012; Liu, 2013; Jann et 
al., 2016). Also, the scanner background noise (SNB) affects the subjects: Benjamin 
et al. (2010) noticed that areas in the dorsal medial prefrontal cortex were more 
activated when subjects were told to either focus or ignore the SNB compared to when 




In conclusion, some of the flaws in fMRI can be overcome with good study designs, 
sufficient preprocessing, and group analysis, but in the end, fMRI is compromising with 
sufficient fast acquisitions versus signal-to-noise ratio. (Långsjö et al., 2012) 
 
4.4 Functional connectivity 
The idea of functional connectivity was developed in the ’80s by observations in EEG 
when coherencies were found between hemispheres and across cortical regions. 
(Rosazza and Minati, 2011). Functional connectivity is defined as temporal correlations 
or synchronization in neural activity between spatially remote neurophysiological 
events (Friston, 1994; Rosazza and Minati, 2011). Generally, it has been used to 
describe the organization, interrelationship, and integrated performance of different 
regions of the brain (Rogers et al., 2007). It can be studied with different modalities. In 
fMRI, the functional connectivity is measured from low frequency (<0,1Hz) BOLD-
signal fluctuations observed throughout the brain (Rosazza and Minati, 2011). 
Functional connectivity does not explain the direction or influence of the connections, 
but with additional models, effective connectivity can be derived from the same data. 
(Friston, 1994; Bonhomme et al., 2019) 
 
The simplest method to study functional connectivity is called a seed-voxel-based 
approach. It uses a selected region of interest (ROI) and compares its activation over 
time to the whole brain’s activations. Functional connectivity can be analyzed from the 
temporal correlation of the activity in the ROI and other areas of the brain. A separate 
analysis of frequency and phase of these correlating activations can be made to specify 
the activations functional connectivity strength for example. (Biswal, 2012; Heine, 
Soddu, Gómez, et al., 2012). A weakness of seed-voxel-based approaches is that the 
ROI and threshold must be determined before the analysis, and they have significant 
effects on the result. ROI selection is especially important in group analysis where a 
wrongly determined ROI can alter the detected functional connectivity remarkably 
(Sohn et al., 2015). 
 
Independent component analysis (ICA) is a more sophisticated data-driven method 
that can analyze the whole brain at once and find functionally connected areas without 
pre-determined ROIs. It divides the dataset from the brain scan into maximally 
statistically independent components, separates the different sources from the signal, 
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and creates a visualization of these components and their sources. Therefore, cardiac 
noise or involuntary movement, for example, can easily be discarded. However, the 
results from data-driven methods are more difficult to interpret because it does not offer 
any classification or ordering of the components. Usually, the easiest way to interpret 
ICA results is by a visual inspection, but this is dependent on the researcher and the 
reproducibility might be inaccurate. Also determining the number of significant 
components may create errors; If the number of components is too high, the 
functionally connected networks may be divided and on the other hand, these areas 
can merge into each other if the amount of components is too low.  (Biswal, 2012; 
Heine, Soddu, Gomez, et al., 2012). Solutions for these practical problems have been 
proposed in a form of probabilistic ICA (Boly et al., 2008). Intrinsic connectivity 
distribution (ICD) is a promising data-driven method that does not rely on pre-defined 
seed regions or connectivity thresholds (Qiu et al., 2017). 
 
In comparison, the seed-voxel-based methods and ICA create similar results. The 
better suitable of these is generally determined by the purpose of the study: Seed-
voxel-based analyses are good at testing hypotheses such as what areas activate with 
a certain region of interest when waking up from anesthesia. ICA is good at mapping 
and visualizing functionally connected areas in certain states of consciousness for 
example. (Rosazza and Minati, 2011). If effective connectivity needs to be measured, 
Granger causality (GC) or dynamic causal model (DMC) can be used. (Bonhomme et 
al., 2019). 
4.5 Brain resting state networks 
The first ideas of the brain being constantly active come from the 1920’s EEG-studies. 
In the ’50s researchers noticed that solving a complex arithmetic problem did not 
increase the global cerebral metabolic rate significantly. Later it was measured that 
task-evoked regional signals increase the brain metabolism by only around 5% 
compared to the resting state. The interest in studying the brain at rest grew on the 
basis that there must be something significant happening with the intrinsic activity 
because it takes the majority of the energy that the brain spends. (Boly et al., 2008)  
The discovery of brain resting state networks happened accidentally. In the early fMRI 
studies when the researchers were trying to get rid of some of the background noise 
of the MRI scanner, a coincidental discovery of slow (<0,1Hz) coherent spontaneous 
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fluctuations originating from remotely located brain areas was made. When analyzed, 
these slow spontaneous BOLD fluctuations formed functionally connected networks. 
(Långsjö, Revonsuo and Scheinin, 2014)  The coherent fluctuations in the fMRI BOLD 
signal correlate with areas that have known functional similarities and it was 
understood that the brain’s neural populations that share a functional structural 
purpose, defined as nodes, form a functionally connected network when they share a 
common purpose with other nodes. (Sohn et al., 2015) 
Later, the globally strongest hubs of functional connectivity in resting state fMRI were 
found in the areas of default mode network (DMN) and the sensory cortices (visual 
cortex and posterior cingulate/precuneus). Other commonly studied networks are the 
executive control network and salience network (Figure 2). (Tomasi and Volkow, 2011; 
Heine, Soddu, Gómez, et al., 2012; Långsjö, Revonsuo and Scheinin, 2014)  
 
Figure 2. | Functional magnetic images of resting state networks. Image: (Heine, 




4.5.1 Default mode network: 
The first hints of default mode network (DMN) come from PET studies when 
researchers discovered unexplained deactivation in certain brain areas during active 
tasks compared to passive tasks like mind-wandering/eye fixation. Later the network 
was identified with fMRI. Its functions and more precise activations were understood 
better than just being “task-negative”.  It is activated by default, without any specific 
task, hence the name default mode network. It is the most studied of the resting state 
networks, perhaps because it does not require much for the subject. (Rosazza and 
Minati, 2011; Heine, Soddu, Gómez, et al., 2012; Långsjö et al., 2012) DMN’s features 
are coherent activity that emerges principally under resting conditions. It has been 
observed across different states of consciousness in humans and other primates and 
is influenced by the characteristics of the task performed just before the scan. 
(Rosazza and Minati, 2011; Heine, Soddu, Gomez, et al., 2012). 
DMN consists of areas involving the precuneus/posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), 
mediofrontal/anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), and temporoparietal junction areas. The 
areas forming the DMN have the highest structural and functional connectivity 
suggesting that It uses the most direct structural connections of all the networks (Horn 
et al., 2014). DMN can be mapped using the PCC as ROI. PCC is the most 
interconnected node and thus considered especially important for the network. (Heine, 
Soddu, Gomez, et al., 2012)  
DMN generally is suggested to be involved in self-referential processing including inner 
speech, mind wandering, stimulus-independent thoughts, social cognition, 
introspection, and integrating cognitive processes (Långsjö et al., 2012). PCC is 
involved in autobiographical memory while anterior parts of the network associate 
more with the inner self (Heine, Soddu, Gómez, et al., 2012).  DMN is observed more 
active during passive cognitive state and it relatively de-activates during tasks requiring 
focused attention for example (Rosazza and Minati, 2011). The network can be divided 
into smaller components, suggested responsible for the different tasks of DMN, by 
measuring anticorrelations within the DMN (Uddin et al., 2009). The connectivity of 
DMN is also noticed to predict recovery of consciousness from altered states of 
consciousness (Qin et al., 2015). 
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4.5.2 Executive control network 
Executive control network (ECN), sometimes referred to as frontoparietal network 
(FPN), is a task-positive network that activates during goal-oriented cognitive tasks 
and goal-directed behavior. Its main functions are sustaining attention, performing 
complex and rule-based problem solving with work memory. The executive control 
network is involved with the salience network, in externally directed attentional 
demands and tasks requiring cognitive control. It has a strong anticorrelation with 
DMN, suggesting the division of labor between different functions of internal and 
external awareness. (Uddin et al., 2009; Heine, Soddu, Gomez, et al., 2012; Bär et al., 
2016)  
ECN encompasses areas of the bilateral middle, inferior, and superior frontal cortices, 
bilateral inferior parietal lobes, ACC/supplementary motor area (SMA), and bilateral 
insular cortices. The left side is considered to involve more language and cognitive 
processing and the right side perceptual somesthetic and nociceptive processing. Both 
sides are deactivated during sleep and anesthesia, but light sedation does not affect 
them significantly. (Heine, Soddu, Gomez, et al., 2012) 
4.5.3 Salience network 
Salience network (SN) is activated during salience emotional processing, conflict 
monitoring, information integration, and response selection. Also, pain-related 
processes and imagination or anticipating painful stimuli have been linked to salience 
network activation. It is considered to be an important mediator or switch between 
frontoparietal and default mode networks. (Heine, Soddu, Gómez, et al., 2012) 
SN consists of areas in the anterior insula (AI) and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC). It 
has connections to subcortical and limbic structures. SN with DMN and ECN is 
suggested to form a triple network where SN controls the orientation of consciousness 





Figure 3. | SN, controlling DMN and ECN (here central executive network) and directing 
the orientation of consciousness. Image: (Nekovarova et al., 2014) 
 
4.5.4 Sensorimotor, visual, and auditory networks 
Sensorimotor network activations relate to motor tasks and the areas it consists of are 
supplementary motor area/midcingulate cortex, bilateral primary motor cortex, and 
bilateral middle frontal gyri. Sensorimotor areas have not been studied relating to the 
search of NCC. (Heine, Soddu, Gómez, et al., 2012) 
 
Visual network consists of three independent components: lateral visual network 
consisting of the middle temporal visual association area at the temporo-occipital 
junction. This part is associated with complex visual rendering such as emotional 
stimuli. The second component is the medial visual network responsible for simple 
visual stimuli. Occipital visual network corresponds with higher-order stimuli, for 
example, orthography. (Heine, Soddu, Gómez, et al., 2012) The visual network has 
been widely studied for the neural correlates of the components of consciousness, but 
not with the states of consciousness.  
 
Auditory network is located in primary and secondary auditory cortices. Also, Heschl’s 
gyrus, bilateral superior temporal gyri, and posterior insular cortex are associated with 
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auditory stimuli. The network is responsible for auditory processing, for example, 
pitch/tone and speech recognition. Concerning both visual and auditory networks, 
there are no reported significant changes in the connectivity between different states 
of consciousness. (Heine, Soddu, Gómez, et al., 2012) 
5 ANESTHETIC-INDUCED CHANGES IN 
FUNCTIONAL CONNECTIVITY AND BRAIN 
RESTING STATE NETWORKS 
 
Anesthetic drugs, such as the aforementioned propofol, dexmedetomidine, and 
ketamine, create the unconscious state by pharmacological mechanisms that are not 
yet entirely understood. Their suggested micro-level mechanisms vary, even though 
they have common features on a macro level, seen with fMRI for example. Also 
understanding the macro-level mechanisms induced by anesthesia should help explain 
the mechanisms of consciousness. (Långsjö, Revonsuo and Scheinin, 2014; 
Bonhomme et al., 2019)  
5.1 Propofol 
In fMRI studies, propofol-induced anesthesia provokes a large drop in overall 
connectivity but also creates hypersynchronous cortical states that are seen in EEG 
as well. (Barttfeld et al., 2015; Song and Yu, 2015) The decreased connectivity 
localizes to cortico-cortical (DMN and SN) and higher-order thalamocortical 
connections. The most dominant changes in connectivity scaled with the extent of 
altered consciousness are in the frontal lobes (Barttfeld et al., 2015; Liu et al., 2017). 
Propofol-induced loss of consciousness (PI-LOC) can be seen by tracking the 
coactivation patterns of PCC (Amico et al., 2014). The decrease in connectivity is 
shown to be independent of changes in reduced CBF (Qiu et al., 2017).  Propofol-
induced anesthesia increases the connectivity between the thalamus and primary 
sensory areas, and the negative correlation between DMN and ECN disappears. 
(Hudetz, 2012; Jordan et al., 2013). In propofol-induced unconsciousness, the regional 
cerebral blood flow (rCBF) seen in PET studies suffers a sharp decrease in all brain 
regions and especially in the thalamocortical and frontoparietal networks (Song and 




The main unsolved question of PI-LOC is the significance of the decrease in 
thalamocortical and cortico-cortical connections. Barttfeld et al. (2015) argue that the 
PI-LOC is directly mediated by the decrease of thalamocortical connectivity rather than 
corticocortical connectivity, similar to falling asleep. Alkire and Miller (2005) propose 
that it could be because of a neuronal hyperpolarization block at the thalamic level. 
Also, during ROC, brain activity returns in the thalamus and lower-order brain regions, 
not in the cortex, suggesting consciousness being a bottom-up process. (Långsjö et 
al., 2012). A recent paper by Scheinin et al. (2021) suggests that cortical suppression 
may not be sufficient for unconsciousness, and might represent unspecific effects of 
the administered anesthetic agent. Instead, their results suggest that the loss and 
return of the connected state of consciousness associates with concomitant reciprocal 
changes in neural activity in a network of brain structures encompassing the thalamus, 
cingulate cortices, and bilateral angular gyri. Another observation by Mhuircheartaigh 
et al. (2010), also suggesting a deeper origin of PI-LOC, is that there is a reduction in 
functional connectivity between the putamen and other brain regions during 
progressive failure to perceive or respond to different stimuli. This reduction happens 
even before the thalamocortical connectivity decreases.  
 
On the contrary, Monti et al. (2013) argue that PI-LOC originates from a decrease in 
cortico-cortical connectivity, without a thalamocortical component. Boveroux et al. 
(2010), Boly et al. (2012), Guldenmund et al. (2013), Jordan et al. (2013), Monti et al. 
(2013) and Warnaby et al. (2016) also report that there is preserved thalamic 
connectivity to the cortex during PI-LOC. Studies also suggest that propofol disrupts 
the top-down processing by decoupling DMN’s higher-order processes from posterior 
sensory processes and suppresses the frontal feedback connectivity (Boveroux et al., 
2010; Jordan et al., 2013). Similar results were also found with EEG studies as there 
was no thalamic component in LOC, but a decrease of backward corticocortical 
connectivity from frontal to the parietal cortex (Boly et al., 2012). The thalamocortical 
disconnection might then be secondary for this cortical connectivity breakdown 
(Hudetz, 2012). 
 
However, there are interesting observations in the studies of Hudetz (2012), Liu et al. 
(2013, 2017) and Song and Yu (2015), supporting a role for thalamus in PI-LOC. 
Thalamus can be divided into specific and non-specific (intralaminar) nuclei. The 
specific system transforms sensory and motor information as the non-specific controls 
 
22 
the cortical arousal and distribution of information across cortical areas. When the 
disconnection of thalamus is more precisely measured, the specific thalamic nuclei 
were only moderately affected as the non-specific nuclei were severely suppressed. 
This suggests that both results from previously mentioned studies concerning thalamic 
origin of PI-LOC may be true if the thalamic connectivity had two components with 
different behavior in the loss of consciousness.  
5.2 Ketamine 
Ketamine, as mentioned earlier, is a unique anesthetic that has many features and 
clinical applications in addition to inducing anesthesia. Ketamine increases functional 
connections globally but disrupts especially higher-order network connectivity. With 
smaller doses, ketamine first disconnects DMN from areas involved in depression and 
with increasing doses disrupts the connectivity between pain-related and sensory 
areas to produce analgesia. (Bonhomme et al., 2016, 2019) 
 
With doses large enough to induce unresponsiveness, especially the connectivity from 
anterior to posterior parts of the brain is disrupted and the anticorrelation between DMN 
and other networks decreases. During deep unconsciousness, ketamine breaks down 
connectivity inside the DMN, particularly separating the medial prefrontal cortex from 
other areas of DMN. The anticorrelation activity is broken down and the connectivity of 
SN decreases. Minimal effects however are seen in ECN, auditory, visual, and 
sensorimotor networks. Also, thalamocortical connectivity is seen to remain relatively 
well and even increase with deep levels of unconsciousness. These findings suggest 
that the mechanism of action is the breakdown of connectivity in the frontoparietal 
DMN, sharing similar features with propofol-induced unconsciousness. The role of 
remaining thalamocortical connectivity has not been analyzed further and remains 
unclear. (Bonhomme et al., 2016, 2019) 
5.3 Dexmedetomidine 
Dexmedetomidine-induced unconsciousness has also similar features with propofol. 
Dexmedetomidine reduces connectivity within higher-order networks and between 
them and the thalamus. As with propofol, during dexmedetomidine-induced 
unconsciousness, the thalamic connectivity to lower-order (auditory, sensorimotor, and 




However, the connectivity between the key nodes of a core network responsible for 
arousal, involving subcortical and limbic regions (brain stem, thalamus, hypothalamus, 
ACC, and salience network) remains relatively intact with dexmedetomidine when 
compared to N3 sleep and propofol. This might explain the unique feature of 
dexmedetomidine that unconsciousness caused by dexmedetomidine can be reversed 
with mild physical stimulation or loud voices without altering the concentration of the 
anesthetic. These areas also resemble the areas that first activate after propofol 
sedation. (Långsjö, Revonsuo and Scheinin, 2014; Guldenmund et al., 2017; 
Bonhomme et al., 2019). During the arousal from dexmedetomidine unconsciousness, 
the induced activations are mostly localized in the deep, phylogenetically old brain 
structures, rather than the neocortex. (Långsjö et al., 2012) 
 
A fMRI/PET study by Akeju et al. (2014) reports intact cortico-cortical functional 
connectivity with dexmedetomidine induced unconsciousness, while the 
thalamocortical connectivity is disrupted. It suggests a thalamic origin for 
dexmedetomidine-induced unconsciousness. The mechanism of a rapid return of 
consciousness can also be explained by returning thalamic connectivity while the 
cortex remains ready to be awake. The differences between sleep or dexmedetomidine 
unconsciousness versus deep anesthesia or a comatose state could also be explained 
by the disruption of only thalamocortical connectivity with intact cortical connectivity 
and disruption of the cortical networks.  
6 DISCUSSION  
 
Comparing the effects that the anesthetic drugs have on brain resting state networks, 
common factors among anesthetics and interesting areas for future research were 
found. Starting with propofol, the altered states of consciousness are strongly 
correlated with the depression of cortico-cortical connectivity and disruption of 
connectivity between non-specific thalamic nodes and the cortex. There is no 
consensus about the origin of these observed decreases in connectivity. It remains 
unsolved which of the observed changes is causally related to the observed change in 
the state of consciousness. The functional connectivity of lower-order networks with 
the thalamus remains intact or even increases during anesthesia. This backs up the 
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theory that propofol-induced unconsciousness would originate from the disruption of 
the higher-order networks on the cortex, while information still flows from the thalamus. 
However, there is also a significant decrease in thalamic connectivity to the higher-
order networks especially from the non-specific nuclei, suggesting that the disrupted 
cortical activity connectivity would be due to thalamic disconnection. 
 
Ketamine has some similarities in the effects it induces on the resting state networks 
as propofol. It induces unconsciousness by breaking down the functional connectivity 
in higher-order networks, but quite surprisingly the connectivity of ECN remains. 
Similarly, as in PI-LOC, the DMN anticorrelation is disrupted while the sensory and 
sensorimotor functional connectivity is preserved. With ketamine-induced 
unconsciousness the thalamocortical functional connectivity remains or even 
increases, suggesting that the anesthetic state induced by ketamine is caused by 
disrupted connectivity in the cortex. However, there has not been further analysis of 
these findings and the case might be similar to propofol, where there may also be 
decreases in some thalamocortical connections causing unconsciousness. 
 
In dexmedetomidine-induced altered states of consciousness, there are also 
similarities to propofol in the effect on resting state networks. The decreased 
connectivity in higher-order networks is the main mediator of unconsciousness and 
connectivity in lower-order networks remains. Dexmedetomidine anesthesia has a 
unique attribute that the subject can quickly regain consciousness when stimulated 
with a loud voice for example. The explanation for this is proposed to be in the relatively 
preserved connectivity between the thalamus and deeper brain areas. An interesting 
discovery is also the remaining cortical connectivity in dexmedetomidine 
unconsciousness that might also explain the rapid recovery from dexmedetomidine 
anesthesia and normal sleep. The cortex would remain functionally connected and 
ready for a powerful enough stimulus to wake up the subject. This unique attribute of 
dexmedetomidine also enables new kinds of study designs as it does not need 
alterations in the CNS concentration. 
 
The role of thalamus as a mediator of consciousness is an unanswered question that 
appears in many studies with different anesthetics. Some role for the thalamus seems 
certain, as in the mammalian brain every cortical region has connections to and from 
the thalamus and its different nuclei, and the brain has therefore been called a 
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thalamocortical system (Jones, 2001). Thalamus has also been noted as important for 
normal consciousness (Kirsch et al., 2017) and for a mediator of the cortico-cortical 
connections (Murray Sherman and Guillery, 2013). The ultimate role of the thalamus 
as the primary mediator of altered states of consciousness, mainly in propofol studies, 
remains debatable. Ward (2011) argues that the thalamus might just be a read-out of 
cortical information. Velly et al. (2007) and Alkire (2008) also claim that thalamic 
depression may come after cortical depression. On the other hand, the theory of a 
thalamic switch-off argues that the thalamus might serve as a switch for controlling 
consciousness. (Barttfeld et al., 2015).  
 
Interesting areas for future research remain firstly the role of the thalamus and its 
different nuclei. Does thalamus have a primary or secondary role in the altered states 
of consciousness, or is the origin of consciousness in the deeper areas of the brain or 
in the cortex? How should the effect of ketamine on thalamic functional connectivity be 
interpreted; does the increased thalamic connectivity indicate a primary role for the 
cortex or is it similar to the increased connectivity seen with propofol between thalamus 
and lower order networks? Dexmedetomidine with its unique features might help to 
resolve some fundamental issues in study designs by providing a tool to study different 
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